Constrained Existence Problem for Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria with ω-Regular Boolean Objectives
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On the Existence of Weak Subgame Perfect Equilibria
We study multi-player turn-based games played on a directed graph, where the number of players and vertices can be infinite. An outcome is assigned to every play of the game. Each player has a preference relation on the set of outcomes which allows him to compare plays. We focus on the recently introduced notion of weak subgame perfect equilibrium (weak SPE). This is a variant of the classical ...
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In previous lectures, we studied Nash Equilibria in normal form games. A strategy is in NE if no single player can gain by deviating from the strategy. In extensive form games the notion of NE remains the same, if no single player can gain by deviating in any way from the actions prescribed to him by the strategy, then the strategy is in NE. The problem in extensive form games is that players a...
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We study n-player turn-based games played on a finite directed graph. For each play, the players have to pay a cost that they want to minimize. Instead of the well-known notion of Nash equilibrium (NE), we focus on the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), a refinement of NE well-suited in the framework of games played on graphs. We also study natural variants of SPE, named weak (resp. v...
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DEFINITION: A game in extensive form, often represented by a game tree, conveys the same information in a slightly different light. The extensive form representation includes (1) a list of players, (2) a set of decision nodes with a well-defined ordering (a partial ordering, to be exact) (3) a one-to-one and onto correspondence from the set of players to the set of decision nodes and (4) a set ...
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For an n-person stochastic game with Borel state space S and compact metric action sets A1, A2, . . . , An, sufficient conditions are given for the existence of subgame perfect equilibria. One result is that such equilibria exist if the law of motion q(·|s, a) is, for fixed s, continuous in a = (a1, a2, . . . , an) for the total variation norm and the payoff functions f1, f2, . . . , fn are bou...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2075-2180
DOI: 10.4204/eptcs.277.2