Constrained interactions and social coordination
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constrained interactions and social coordination
We consider a co-evolutionary model of social coordination and network formation where agents may decide on an action in a 2 × 2 coordination game and on whom to establish costly links to. We find that a payoff dominant convention is selected for a wider parameter range when agents may only support a limited number of links as compared to a scenario where agents are not constrained in their lin...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2014.04.001