Constrained opinion dynamics: freezing and slow evolution

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چکیده

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Constrained opinion dynamics: freezing and slow evolution

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and General

سال: 2003

ISSN: 0305-4470

DOI: 10.1088/0305-4470/36/3/103