Constraints to Budget Implimentation in Nigeria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Budget Constraints in Prediction Markets
An automated market maker is a natural and common mechanism to subsidize information acquisition, revelation, and aggregation in a prediction market. The sought-after prediction aggregate is the equilibrium price. However, traders with budget constraints are restricted in their ability to impact the market price on their own. We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades in the presence...
متن کاملEndogenous budget constraints in auctions
In prior literature, bidders’ budget constraints have been shown to change revenue and efficiency rankings among auction formats. These results, however, are based on the implicit assumption that the nature of the budget constraint is unaffected by auction rules. I extend the standard symmetric model of auctions for a single good to include principals responsible for deciding on the bidder’s bu...
متن کاملBudget Constraints in Prediction Markets
We give a detailed characterization of optimal trades under budget constraints in a prediction market with a cost-function-based automated market maker. We study how the budget constraints of individual traders affect their ability to impact the market price. As a concrete application of our characterization, we give sufficient conditions for a property we call budget additivity: two traders wi...
متن کاملAuctions with Budget Constraints
In a combinatorial auction k different items are sold to n bidders, where the objective of the seller is to maximize the revenue. The main difficulty to find an optimal allocation is due to the fact that the valuation function of each bidder for bundles of items is not necessarily an additive function over the items. An auction with budget constraints is a common special case where bidders gene...
متن کاملSize and soft budget constraints
There is much evidence against the so-called ”too big to fail” hypothesis in the case of bailouts to sub-national governments. We look at a model where districts of different size provide local public goods with positive spillovers. Matching grants of a central government can induce socially-efficient provision, but districts can still exploit the intervening central government by inducing dire...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: World Journal of Innovative Research
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2456-8236
DOI: 10.31871/wjir.7.4.31