Contested multilateralism as credible signaling: how strategic inconsistency can induce cooperation among states
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of International Organizations
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1559-7431,1559-744X
DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09398-7