Contests with multiple rounds
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contests with multiple rounds
This paper studies contests where players have the ßexibility to add to their previous efforts after observing their rivals most recent effort in an intermediate stage. It is found that (1) contrary to previous Þndings, the Stackelberg outcome where the underdog leads and the favorite follows cannot be an equilibrium. (2) There are multiple subgame perfect equilibria all occuring on the underd...
متن کاملTeam Contests with Multiple Pairwise Battles∗
We study a contest between two teams. The teams include an equal number of players. Each player of a team participates in a component battle, competing against a matched rival from the other team. A team wins if and only if its players prevail in a suffi ciently large number of component battles. The winning team is awarded a prize, which is a public good for all its players. In addition, a pla...
متن کاملPrivate Auctions with Multiple Rounds and Multiple Items
For selling spectrum licenses economists have designed new auction types proceeding over several rounds and offering several licenses simultaneously. Communication between bidders usually is forbidden to prevent collusions (i.e., through separate compartments and supervision). We investigate these auctions from the cryptographic point of view and identify that the usual implementation by a succ...
متن کاملKleptoparasitic melees--modelling food stealing featuring contests with multiple individuals.
Kleptoparasitism is the stealing of food by one animal from another. This has been modelled in various ways before, but all previous models have only allowed contests between two individuals. We investigate a model of kleptoparasitism where individuals are allowed to fight in groups of more than two, as often occurs in real populations. We find the equilibrium distribution of the population amo...
متن کاملContests with Size Effects Contests with Size Effects
In this paper we analyze the structure of contest equilibria with a variable number of agents. First we analyze a situation where the total prize depends on the number of agents and where every single agent faces opportunity costs of investing in the contest. Second we analyze a situation where the agents face a trade-off between productive and appropriative investments. Here, the number of age...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.004