Continuous Patrolling Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Continuous Patrolling Sometimes it is necessary to have a Patroller (on foot, in car, or maybe drone) move around network so as prevent an intruder (the Attacker) from infiltrating otherwise ruining the operation. The “attack” could be, for example, removing painting Louvre, crossing border, planting bomb. first possibility take place at only discrete set of points on network, say, nodes. However, last two types attack anywhere. latter continuous problem has been modelled game by Steve Alpern, Thuy Bui, Thomas Lidbetter, and Katerina Papadaki article “Continuous Games.” Attacker decides when where duration specified problem), whereas chooses unit speed path, possibly periodic. If passes attacked point while going on, he wins game, thwarted. Otherwise successful, game. authors determine optimal strategies both players many classes networks find good that work any network. These ideas be adapted real-life patrolling problems networks.
منابع مشابه
Adversarial Patrolling Games
Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strategies in adversarial domains such as the United states Federal Air Marshals Service and the United States Coast Guard, among others. In Stackelberg game models of these systems the attacker knows only the probability that each target is covered by the defender, but is oblivious to the...
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Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools deployed for computing optimal patrolling strategies in adversarial domains such as the United states Federal Air Marshals Service and the United States Coast Guard, among others. In Stackelberg game models of these systems the attacker knows only the probability that each target is covered by the defender, but is oblivious to the...
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Recently, there has been a significant interest in studying security games to provide tools for addressing resource allocation problems in security applications. Patrolling security games (PSGs) constitute a special class of security games wherein the resources are mobile. One of the most relevant open problems in security games is the design of scalable algorithms to tackle realistic scenarios...
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Adversarial patrolling games (APGs) can be modeled as Stackelberg games where a patroller and an intruder compete. The former moves with the aim of detecting an intrusion, while the latter tries to intrude without being detected. In this paper, we introduce alarms in APGs, namely devices that can remotely inform the patroller about the presence of the intruder at some location. We introduce a b...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Operations Research
سال: 2022
ISSN: ['1526-5463', '0030-364X']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2346