Continuous-time evolutionary dynamics: theory and practice
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Research in Economics
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1090-9443
DOI: 10.1006/reec.1999.0227