Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution Under Uncertainty
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Continuous-Time Public Good Contribution under Uncertainty
We study a continuous-time problem of optimal public good contribution under uncertainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent can allocate his wealth between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study the corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents and ...
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Behaviour in public good experiments is usually attributed partly to rational self-interest and partly to social norms and preferences. This paper examines if sensitivity to social desirability affects public good contribution and in what way. A pre-experimental measure of social desirability (SDS17) was used to match partners in a two-person public good game. Half the participants received exp...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2013
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2292736