Contract Damages for Injury to Reputation

Reputation and Optimal Contract for Central Bankers

We implement optimal economic outcomes at the lowest social cost by combining reputation and contracting mechanisms to overcome the time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy associated with an inflation bias. We characterize the condition under which the reputation force alone induces a central bank to behave in a socially optimal way. When this condition fails, an incentive contract is inv...

Specific Performance versus Damages for Breach of Contract

When would parties to a contract want performance to be specifically required, and when would they prefer payment of money damages to be the remedy for breach? This fundamental question is studied here, and an answer is provided that is based on a simple distinction between contracts to produce goods and contracts to convey property. Setting aside qualifications, the conclusion for breach of co...

Building Reputation for Contract Renewal: Implications for Performance Dynamics and Contract Duration

Due to technological progress, recent performance is often more informative about future performance prospects than is older performance. We incorporate information decay in a career concern model in which performance depends on type and effort and contract renewal is based on the performance record. In contrast with the career concern literature (e.g. Lewis, 1986; RJE), contractors work harder...

Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule

On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity

We study the impact of reputational incentives in markets characterized by moral hazard problems. Social preferences have been shown to enhance contract enforcement in these markets, while at the same time generating considerable wage and price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by increasing contract efficiency substanti...