Contract Design: Risk Management and Evaluation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contract Design: Risk Management and Evaluation
risks and how to evaluate healthcare contracts? The research questions in this series of three articles focus on how reimbursement strategies (especially Pay for Performance P4P), evaluation of measures and methods of risk adjustment can best be integrated in healthcare contracting. This last article of the series will spot light on the specific topic of risk adjustment as well as evaluation an...
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Introduction Integrated care systems as well as accountable care organisations (ACOs) in the US and similar concepts in other countries are advocated as an effective method of improving the performance of healthcare systems. These systems outline a payment and care delivery model that intends to tie provider reimbursements to predefined quality metrics. By this the total costs of care shall be ...
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Contract and rights management – and thus property rights protection – has gained increasing importance as a quality standard in brokerage and electronic commerce environments. Contract and rights management provides information on the legal relationships associated with digital assets, as well as intellectual property rights protection and the enforcement of rights. However, many brokerage and...
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In the managed care era, mental health professionals increasingly rely upon suicide prevention contracts in the management of patients at suicide risk. Although asking a patient if he or she is suicidal and obtaining a written or oral contract against suicide can be useful, these measures by themselves are insufficient. "No harm" contracts cannot take the place of formal suicide risk assessment...
متن کاملFairness and Contract Design
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit incentive contracts when there are some fair-minded players. But trust contracts that pay a generous w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Integrated Care
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1568-4156
DOI: 10.5334/ijic.3616