منابع مشابه
Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...
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This paper examines the effort incentives of teachers in rural China. China employs a complex system of annual evaluations and promotions for civil servants in which good evaluations, along with a teacher's years of service and education, make teachers eligible to apply for rank promotions. A model of promotions is developed in which agents are both incentivized, and are sorted into ranks by ab...
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I present a generalization to the standard career concerns model and apply it to the public teacher labor market. In particular, this model provides three testable hypotheses: optimal teacher effort levels decline with experience all things equal, optimal effort declines with tenure at a particular school, and teachers shirk as incentives collapse at the end of a teacher’s career or tenure. Usi...
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Abstract: The processed potato industry is highly vertically coordina ted though the use of production contracts between growers and processors. Contracts in this industry are primarily used to combat market thinness and potato quality requirements. This study uses a two period principle-agent model to describe the incentives inherit in processing potato production contracts. Actual processor p...
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We consider a basic model of a risk-neutral principal incentivizing a risk neutral agent to exert effort in order to raise the arrival rate of a Poisson process. The effort is costly to the agent, unobservable to the principal, and affects the instantaneous arrival rate. Each arrival yields a constant revenue to the principal. The principal, therefore, devises a mechanism involving payments and...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Real Estate Research
سال: 2010
ISSN: 0896-5803,2691-1175
DOI: 10.1080/10835547.2010.12091290