Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail

Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail

This paper develops a theoretical framework for studying contract and enforcement in settings of complete, but unverifiable, information. The main point of the paper is that the consideration of renegotiation necessitates formal examination of other technological constraints, especially those having to do with the timing and nature of inalienable productive decisions. The main technical contrib...

On Detail-Free Mechanism Design and Rationality

The study of mechanism design is sometimes criticized, because the designed mechanisms depend on the fine detail of the model specification, and agents’ behavior relies on the strong common knowledge assumptions on their rationality and others. Hence, the study of ‘detail-free’ mechanism design with weak informational assumptions is the most important to make as the first step towards a practic...

Detail-free mechanism design in twice iterative dominance: Large economies

This paper investigates unique implementation in large economies with incomplete information and interdependent values; we degenerate the common knowledge assumptions and assume that a central planner is unaware of the specifications of an environment. With a minor restriction on the class of environments, we demonstrate that there exists a detail-free mechanism that virtually implements compet...

Contract Renegotiation, Mechanism Design, and the Liquidated Damages Rule

Contract Theory for Incentive Mechanism Design in Cooperative Relaying Networks

Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, we apply a contract-based principal-agent framework to a cognit...