Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contractible Contracts in Common Agency Problems
This paper analyzes contactual situations between many principals and many agents. Agents have private information and principals take actions. Principals can contract not only on the reports of the agents but also on the contracts offered by the other principals. Contracts are required to be representable in a formal language. The main result of the paper is a full characterization of the allo...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu025