Contracting in FM: collaboration, coordination and control

Coordination, collaboration and cooperation

Coordination and discrimination in contracting with externalities: divide and conquer?

The paper studies bilateral contracting between N agents and one principal, whose trade with each agent generates externalities on other agents. It examines the effects of prohibiting the principal from (i) coordinating agents on her preferred equilibrium, and (ii) making different contracts available to different agents. These effects depend on whether an agent is more or less eager to trade w...

Coordination and bargaining power in contracting with externalities

Building on Genicot and Ray (2006) we develop a model on non-cooperative bargaining that combines the two main approaches in the literature of contracting with externalities: the o¤er game (in which the principal makes simultaneous o¤ers to the agents) and the bidding game (in which the agents make simultaneous o¤ers to the principal). Allowing for agent coordination, we show that the outcome o...

Coordination and Awareness in Remote Tabletop Collaboration

Remote collaboration technologies frequently provide a shared visual workspace of the task at hand, but often lack support for the visual cues and work practices of co-located collaboration. This is particularly acute in design tasks, in which the shared workspace is the focus of collaboration. Lately there has been growing interest in remote tabletop interfaces: large horizontal interactive su...

Coordination and Efficiency in Decentralized Collaboration

Environments for decentralized on-line collaboration are now widespread on the Web, underpinning open-source efforts, knowledge creation sites including Wikipedia, and other experiments in joint production. When a distributed group works together in such a setting, the mechanisms they use for coordination can play an important role in the effectiveness of the group’s performance. Here we consid...