Contractors’ risks in Design, Novate and Construct contracts
نویسندگان
چکیده
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Project Management
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0263-7863
DOI: 10.1016/s0263-7863(00)00051-x