Contracts at limited liability company
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Limited-liability Contracts with Earnings Management
Numerous principal-agent situations of interest to accounting involve limited liability by the agent. We explore this issue when the outcome is mutually observable (MOC) and when it is not and the contract is based instead on the agent’s report (NCC). We find that when outcome is not observable, the effect of limited lia bility depends on the level of limited liability: when low – no effect; wh...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Entrepreneurship, Economy and Law
سال: 2021
ISSN: 2663-5313
DOI: 10.32849/2663-5313/2021.1.14