Contracts, trust and information systems innovation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
INforMATIoN sYsTEMs ANd INNovATIoN
A new Information System must be adopted before it can be used. New Information Systems can be seen as innovations and viewed through the lens of innovations theory. In this article I will argue that much Information Systems research falls into this category, and that its explanation could benefit from application of innovation theory. One of the difficulties facing any such investigation, howe...
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Despite the scholarly interest in contracts and trust governing interorganizational relationships, an understanding of how contracts influence trust remains limited by the way in which the interaction between the two constructs is conceptualized. By bringing together recent advances in the literature on interorganizational governance, I consider (a) the controlling and the coordinating dimensio...
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We extend the standard agency framework to allow for complex information, trustworthiness of the principal, and incomplete contracts and show that contractual incompleteness arises endogenously when there is enough complexity and trust. Several predictions of the standard model break down in our more general construction: trust plays a crucial role in the design of optimal contracts; not all th...
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In the one-shot trust or investment game without opportunities for reputation formation or contracting, economic theory predicts no trusting because there is no incentive for trustworthiness. Under these conditions, theory predicts (a) no effect of pre-play communication, and (b) universal preference for moderate cost binding contracts over interacting without contracts. We introduce the opport...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Cadernos EBAPE.BR
سال: 2010
ISSN: 1679-3951
DOI: 10.1590/s1679-39512010000200009