Contracts versus Salaries in Matching
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Contracts versus Salaries in Matching
594 Workers and firms may bargain over general, multidimensional contracts; they may negotiate over health benefits, housing, retirement plans, etc. Substitutes, on the other hand, is the assumption commonly placed on firms’ preferences to guarantee the existence of stable matchings of workers and firms. In this paper I show that, when firms regard contracts as substitutes, bargaining over cont...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/aer.102.1.594