Convergence of price processes under two dynamic double auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Price Formation in Double Auctions
We develop a model of information processing and strategy choice for participants in a double auction. Sellers in this model form beliefs that an offer will be accepted by some buyer. Similarly, buyers form beliefs that a bid will be accepted. These beliefs are formed on the basis of observed market data, including frequencies of asks, bids, accepted asks, and accepted bids. Then traders choose...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
سال: 2016
ISSN: 2399-844X,2399-8458
DOI: 10.22574/jmid.2016.12.001