Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation in Games with Forgetfulness
Companies and managers are apt to forget information, yet game theory assumes that all players have perfect recall. This paper expands the literature by examining how introducing forgetfulness into a multi-player game-theoretic framework can help or hinder cooperative behavior. We distinguish between forgetting histories and forgetting strategies, and explain how classic game theory models and ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Management Science
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0025-1909,1526-5501
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1100.1271