Cooperation through imitation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperation through imitation
This paper characterizes long-run outcomes for broad classes of symmetric games played over time, when players select actions on the basis of average historical performance. Received wisdom is that, in those environments where agent’s interests are partially opposed, behavior is excessively competitive: “keeping up with the Jones’ ” lowers everyones’ welfare. Here, we study the long-run consequ...
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Kandori, Mailath and Rob [1993] and Young [1993] showed how introducing random innovations into a model of evolutionary adjustment enables selection among Nash equilibria. Key to this result is that poorly performing strategies may be introduced in sufficient numbers that they begin to perform well. We examine imitation as an alternative propagation mechanism. If imitation is much more likely t...
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We study a setting where imitative players are matched into pairs to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma game. A well known result in such setting is that under random matching cooperation vanishes for any interior initial condition. The novelty of this paper is that we consider partial rematching: players that belong to a pair where both parties cooperate repeat partner next period whilst all other play...
متن کاملImitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
A prior signalling stage is added to the prisoner’s dilemma and the overall population involved is divided into a number of subpopulations. Evolution involves both local and global imitation—so that the process is formally one of “group selection.” A subpopulation that is not signalling and defecting against one and all can be invaded by two “secret handshake” mutants. A subpopulation that is c...
متن کاملImperfect Imitation Can Enhance Cooperation
The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional imitation. To study the transition between both regimes, we propose a new evolutionary rule, which stochastically combines unconditional imitation with another imi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2009.01.008