Cooperation under Incomplete Contracting
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Utilitarian Cooperation under Incomplete Information∗
A theory of cooperative choice under incomplete information is developed in which agents possess private information at the time of contracting. It is assumed that the group of cooperating agents has agreed on a utilitarian “standard of fairness” (group preference ordering) governing choices under complete information. The task is to extend this standard to choices whose consequences depend on ...
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In the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, when every player has a different discount factor, the grim-trigger strategy is an equilibrium if and only if the discount factor of each player is higher than some threshold. What happens if the players have incomplete information regarding the discount factors? In this work we look at repeated games in which each player has incomplete information regarding ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1440096