Cooperative and non-cooperative behaviour in the exploitation of a common renewable resource with environmental stochasticity

Classical fisheries biology aims to optimise fisheries-level outcomes, such as yield or profit, by controlling the fishing effort. This can be adjusted allow for effects of environmental stochasticity, noise, in population dynamics. However, when multiple entities, which could represent countries, commercial organisations, individual vessels, autonomously determine their own effort, optimal action one entity depends on actions others. Coupled with noise dynamics, and decisions about effort made repeatedly, this becomes an iterated stochastic game. We tackle problem using tools optimisation, first monopolist’s then duopolist’s problem. In each case, we derive policies that specify best level a given stock biomass. Under these policies, calculate equilibrium biomass, expected long-term return from probability collapse. also show there is threshold biomass below it stop until recovers. develop agent-based model test effectiveness simple strategies responding deviations opponent cooperative level. Our results economic value fishery monopolist, consortium agents, robust certain noise. without means making agreements even low levels make sustained cooperation between autonomous agents difficult.