منابع مشابه
A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS
In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...
متن کاملStochastic Games with Borel Payoffs
Thus H∞ = (A×B × S)× (A×B × S)× . . . . Let f be a bounded Borel-measurable function defined on H∞, where the sets A,B, and S are given the discrete topology and H∞ is given the product topology. The stochastic game S(f)(z) begins at state z ∈ S, player 1 chooses a strategy σ, player 2 chooses a strategy τ , and then 2 pays 1 the expected value of f , namely Ez,σ,τf . Theorem 1 (Martin [5]) The...
متن کاملOn Superadditivity and Convexity for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs
In this paper we study the relations between superadditivity and several types of convexity for cooperative games with random payoffs. The types of convexity considered are marginal convexity (all marginal vectors belong to the core), individual-merge convexity (any individual player is better off joining a larger coalition) and coalitional-merge convexity (any coalition of players is better of...
متن کاملHidden Stochastic Games and Limit Equilibrium Payoffs
We consider 2-player stochastic games with perfectly observed actions, and study the limit, as the discount factor goes to one, of the equilibrium payoffs set. In the usual setup where current states are observed by the players, we show that the set of stationary equilibrium payoffs always converges, and provide a simple example where the set of equilibrium payoffs has no limit. We then introdu...
متن کاملThe Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs
The compromise value is introduced for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. It is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights. This solution concept is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ -value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a game is bounded by th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research
سال: 1999
ISSN: 0377-2217
DOI: 10.1016/s0377-2217(97)00421-9