Cooperative network design: A Nash bargaining solution approach
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cooperative network design: A Nash bargaining solution approach
The Network Design problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering almost exclusively networks designed by selfish users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network design issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among users. Both the Nash barg...
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The Network Formation problem has received increasing attention in recent years. Previous works have addressed this problem considering only networks designed by sel sh users, which can be consistently suboptimal. This paper addresses the network formation issue using cooperative game theory, which permits to study ways to enforce and sustain cooperation among agents. Both the Nash bargaining s...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Computer Networks
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1389-1286
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2015.03.017