CORE CONCEPTS FOR DYNAMIC TU GAMES
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Core Concepts for Dynamic TU Games
This paper is concerned with the question of how to de ne the core when cooperation takes place in a dynamic setting. The focus is on dynamic cooperative games in which the players face a nite sequence of exogenously speci ed TU-games. Three di erent core concepts are presented: the classical core, the strong sequential core and the weak sequential core. The di erences between the concepts aris...
متن کاملCore extensions for non-balanced TU-games
A family of core extensions for cooperative TU-games is introduced. These solution concepts are non-empty when applied to non-balanced games yet coincide with the core whenever the core is non-empty. The extensions suggest how an exogenous regulator can sustain a stable and efficient outcome, financing a subsidy via individual taxes. Economic and geometric properties of the solution concepts ar...
متن کاملThe Core of Large Differentiable TU Games
For non-atomic TU games ν satisfying suitable conditions, the core can be determined by computing appropriate derivatives of ν. Further, such computations yield one of two stark conclusions: either core(ν) is empty or it consists of a single measure that can be expressed explicitly in terms of derivatives of ν. In this sense, core theory for a class of games may be reduced to calculus.
متن کاملA Note on the Weak Sequential Core of Dynamic TU Games
This paper addresses a problem with an argument in Kranich, Perea, and Peters (2005) supporting their definition of the Weak Sequential Core and their characterization result. We also provide the remedy, a modification of the definition, to rescue the characterization.
متن کاملOn reasonable outcomes and the core in cooperative TU games
We provide a different axiomatization of the core interpreted as a reasonable set (Milnor, 1952) and introduce a new property, called max-intersection, related with the vector lattice structure of cooperative games with transferable utility. In particular, it is shown that the core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonability, max-intersection and modularity.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Game Theory Review
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0219-1989,1793-6675
DOI: 10.1142/s0219198905000417