منابع مشابه
Cores of combined games
This paper studies the core of combined games, obtained by summing different coalitional games when bargaining over multiple independent issues. It is shown that the set of balanced transferable utility games can be partitioned into equivalence classes of component games to determine whether the core of the combined game coincides with the sum of the cores of its components. © 2009 Elsevier Inc...
متن کاملCoral Games and the Core of Cores
Casual observation reveals that groups of people interact on many levels simultaneously. Examples include political party formation and interaction; the interaction of Sunnis, Shias and Kurds in the Government of Iraq; and labor union and confederation formation. In this paper, a model of hierarchical group structures is developed. The model generalizes the existing coalitional theory in severa...
متن کاملCores of convex and strictly convex games
We follow the path initiated in Shapley (1971) and study the geometry of the core of convex and strictly convex games. We define what we call face games and use them to study the combinatorial complexity of the core of a strictly convex game. Remarkably, we present a picture that summarizes our results with the aid of Pascal’s triangle. JEL classification: C71.
متن کاملCores of Cooperative Games in Information Theory
Cores of cooperative games are ubiquitous in information theory and arise most frequently in the characterization of fundamental limits in various scenarios involving multiple users. Examples include classical settings in network information theory such as Slepian-Wolf source coding and multiple access channels, classical settings in statistics such as robust hypothesis testing, and new setting...
متن کاملCores of non-atomic market games
We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Social Sciences
سال: 1982
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(82)90015-4