Corporate control and credible commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate Control and Credible Commitment
The separation of control and ownership – the ability of a small group effectively to control a company though holding a minority of its cash flow rights – is common throughout the world, but also is commonly decried. The control group, it is thought, will use its position to consume excessive amounts of the firm’s returns, and this injures minority shareholders in two ways: there is less money...
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Scholars have argued that credible commitment institutions have important impacts on political outcomes as diverse as economic growth and social order. If commitment institutions function as theorized, then their effects should vary across individuals, groups, or states, based on their respective vulnerability to promise breaking. Yet existing empirical studies never pursue this implication. Th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Law and Economics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0144-8188
DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2015.06.002