Corporate governance and firm value: International evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Does Corporate Governance Affect Firm Value? Evidence from Korea
† Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Second Asian Conference on Corporate Governance (2002), 8th Mitsui Life Symposium on Global Financial Markets (2002), International Monetary Fund (2003), KAEA (Korea America Economic Association) annual meeting (2003), Korea Fair Trade Commission (2002), Korea Association of Industrial Organization (2002), KDI School of Public Policy and Ma...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Empirical Finance
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0927-5398
DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.10.003