Corporate Governance and the Value of Excess Cash Holdings of Large European Firms
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Cash Holdings and Corporate Governance –
In this paper, we provide new and complementing international evidence on the relation between cash holdings, corporate governance, and firm value. Our sample consists of a crosssection of 1,875 firms from 46 countries in 2007. We construct eight different measures of firm-level corporate governance based on 64 individual governance attributes provided by Governance Metrics International (GMI)....
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Agency problems are an important determinant of corporate cash holdings. For a sample of more than 11,000 firms from 45 countries, we find that corporations in countries where shareholders rights are not well protected hold up to twice as much cash as corporations in countries with good shareholder protection. In addition, when shareholder protection is poor, factors that generally drive the ne...
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The average cash holdings of Chinese-listed firms decreased significantly after the split share structure reform in China, which specified a process that allowed previously nontradable shares held by controlling shareholders to be freely tradable on the exchanges. The reduction in cash holdings is greater for firms with weaker governance and firms facing more financial constraints prior to the ...
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The paper explores the driving forces behind corporate cash holdings by analyzing past literature and extending this research to the behavior of firms after the 2008 recession. I look at the cash to assets and net debt to assets ratios from October 1980 to October 2011 to obtain an understanding of the past and current state of cash holdings. A comprehensive literature review is done on agency ...
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We examine whether and how a US cross-listing mitigates the risk that insiders will turn their firm’s cash holdings into private benefits. We find strong evidence that the value investors attach to excess cash reserves is substantially larger for foreign firms listed on US exchanges and over-the-counter than for their domestic peers. Further, we show that this excess-cash premium stems not only...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Financial Management
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1354-7798
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-036x.2011.00615.x