Corporate Governance, Financial Performance and Firm Value;
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate governance and firm performance
Available online 4 April 2008 How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions...
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Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...
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We consider the advantages and disadvantages of stakeholder-oriented firms that are concerned with employees and suppliers as well as shareholders compared to shareholderoriented firms. Societies with stakeholder-oriented firms have higher prices, lower output, and can have greater firm value than shareholder-oriented societies. In some circumstances, firms may voluntarily choose to be stakehol...
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An impressive volume of careful empirical studies finds evidence that the strength of firms’ corporate governance tends to be positively correlated with their financial performance; that is, firms that score higher on some measure of governance tend to outperform those which score worse. These findings are a puzzle insofar as we expect those who decide how a firm is organized, including its cor...
متن کاملAccounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance
We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies (2147-4486)
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2147-4486
DOI: 10.20525/ijfbs.v8i4.608