Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Firm Risk , Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, (1989) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance is to set up supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk and effort orientation of agents to align them with the interests of principals. Therefore, the objective of this study is to determine the efficiency of monitoring and incentive contracts given certain characteristics of the firm. That ...

Corporate governance and firm performance

Available online 4 April 2008 How is corporate governance measured? What is the relationship between corporate governance and performance? This paper sheds light on these questions while taking into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and corporate ownership structure. We make three additional contributions...

Corporate Lobbying Revisited

Ownership Structure and Corporate Firm Performance

Corporate Governance deals with the issue, how suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment. Several Studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. Using different samples most of the studies provide general support for the argument that increase in managerial ownership increases firm performance. Howev...

Accounting Discretion, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance

We investigate whether accounting discretion is (i) abused by opportunistic managers who exploit lax governance structures, or (ii) used by managers in a manner consistent with efficient contracting and shareholder value-maximization. Prior research documents an association between accounting discretion and poor governance quality and concludes that such evidence is consistent with abuse of the...