Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Corporate governance and hostile takeovers
In the preceding paper Shivdasani (1993) estimates equations predicting the probability of a hostile takeover as a function of governance characteristics. He finds that additional outside directorships by board members decrease the probability of a takeover. Ownership by management and by affiliated blockholders also decreases the probability of a takeover, while ownership by unaffiliated block...
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Table A1. Glossary of Governance and Takeover Germs Term Description Hostile takeover Acquirer makes takeover offer without target firm board consent or approval Unsolicited takeover Generally synonymous with hostile takeover. Also means the offer was not requested by the target firm board. Antitakeover provisions Target firm provisions in the bylaws or board approved motions to prevent unsolic...
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This paper examines the corporate governance role of firms’ information quality and the takeover market in disciplining management. We consider a model where the takeover market plays a disciplinary role in replacing the inefficient incumbent manager to increase firm value. Increasing the information quality improves the takeover efficiency, but more precise information also discourages the man...
متن کاملDoes fairness matter in corporate takeovers?
In interviews with the two head negotiators for a buying and a selling company in a Swedish takeover, a fair price was found to play an important role. A stated reason was that the companies wanted to do business in the future. To further test the importance of fairness, 88 graduate students of business administration playing the role of buyers were asked to evaluate selling prices in ®ctitious...
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We examine the relation between institutional ownership in acquiring firms and their post takeover stock performance. We find that negative long-run abnormal returns appear to decline (in economic and statistical terms) as the extent and persistence of institutional ownership increase, after accounting for the size, book-to-market and method of payment effects. Given the unusually high uncertai...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Perspectives
سال: 1988
ISSN: 0895-3309
DOI: 10.1257/jep.2.1.69