Correcting credences with chances
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Sleeping Beauty’s Credences
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-018-02037-0