Correction to: Perfect information games where each player acts only once

Games with Perfect Information

Perfect-Information Stochastic Parity Games

We show that in perfect-information stochastic parity games with a finite state space both players have optimal pure positional strategies. Contrary to the recent proofs of this fact by K. Chatterejee, M. Jurdziński, T.A. Henzinger [2] and A.K. McIver, C.C. Morgan [14] the proof given in this paper proceeds by a straightforward induction on the number of outgoing transitions available to one of...

Perfect Information Stochastic Priority Games

We introduce stochastic priority games — a new class of perfect information stochastic games. These games can take two different, but equivalent, forms. In stopping priority games a play can be stopped by the environment after a finite number of stages, however, infinite plays are also possible. In discounted priority games only infinite plays are possible and the payoff is a linear combination...

Once and only once.

V enous thrombosis is a fairly common disorder that manifests mainly as deep vein thrombosis of the leg or pulmonary embolism. It affects 1 in 1000 individuals annually and has a substantial mortality rate. 1 Its causes are both genetic (prothrombotic abnormalities sometimes referred to as a group as thrombophilia) and acquired. 2 Among the latter are cancer, female hormone use, and all forms o...

Computing an Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium in Two-Player Games

Equilibrium computation in games is currently considered one of the most challenging issues in AI. In this paper, we provide, to the best of our knowledge, the first algorithm to compute a Selten’s extensive–form perfect equilibrium (EFPE) with two–player games. EFPE refines the Nash equilibrium requiring the equilibrium to be robust to slight perturbations of both players’ behavioral strategie...