Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations
This paper proposes new concepts of strong and coalition-proof correlated equilibria where agents form coalitions at the interim stage and share information about their recommendations in a credible way. When players deviate at the interim stage, coalition-proof correlated equilibria may fail to exist for two-player games. However, coalitionproof correlated equilibria always exist in dominance-...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.09.034