Correlated equilibrium and concave games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Correlated equilibrium and concave games
This paper shows that if a game satisfies the sufficient condition for the existence and uniqueness of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium provided by Rosen (1965) then the game has a unique correlated equilibrium, which places probability one on the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. In addition, it shows that a weaker condition suffices for the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium. The con...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0098-x