Correlated equilibrium with generalized information structures
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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The set of outcomes that can arise in Bayes Nash equilibria of an incomplete information game where players may have access to additional signals beyond the given information structure is equivalent to the set of a version of incomplete information correlated equilibrium which we dub Bayes correlated equilibrium. A game of incomplete information can be decomposed into a basic game, given by act...
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* Bergemann: Department of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511 (e-mail: [email protected]); Morris: Department of Economics, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544 (e-mail: [email protected]). We acknowledge financial support from NSF SES 1459899. We would like to thank our discussant, Drew Fudenberg, and Ben Brooks, Jeff Ely, Emir Kamenica, Laurent Mathevet, and Tymofi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 1992
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/0899-8256(92)90014-j