Correlation through bounded recall strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Games with Stationary Bounded Recall Strategies
A great deal of attention has been paid recently to repeated games with bounded complexity. References [3, 5, 63 and others deal with repeated games played by automata. In this case the set of strategies is reduced to the set of those strategies that can be realized by automata. Here we address ourselves to repeated games played by players with bounded recall who do not know the stage in which ...
متن کاملAttention, Coordination, and Bounded Recall∗
I consider a flexible framework of strategic interactions under incomplete information in which, prior to committing their actions (consumption, production, or investment decisions), agents choose the attention to allocate to an arbitrarily large number of information sources about the primitive events that are responsible for the incompleteness of information (the exogenous fundamentals). The ...
متن کاملFolk Theorems with Bounded Recall
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of...
متن کاملTime Dependent Bounded Recall Strategies Are Enough to Play the Discounted Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma∗
We show that for any discount factor, there is a natural number M such that all subgame perfect outcomes of the discounted repeated prisoners’ dilemma (pure strategies) can be obtained by subgame perfect strategies with the following property: current play depends only on the number of the time-index and on the history of the last M periods. This strong result, however, does not suffice to esta...
متن کاملA Minority Game with Bounded Recall
This paper studies a repeated minority game with public signals, symmetric bounded recall, and pure strategies. We investigate both public and private equilibria of the game with fixed recall size. We first show how public equilibria in such a repeated game can be represented as colored subgraphs of a de Bruijn graph. Then we prove that the set of public equilibrium payoffs with bounded recall ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-012-0334-x