Cost differentials and mixed strategy equilibria in a Hotelling model
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Annals of Regional Science
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0570-1864,1432-0592
DOI: 10.1007/s00168-007-0197-4