Cournot Oligopoly with Information Sharing
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly
-----------------------------We model an oligopolistic industry where a number of firms that are asymmetrically informed about the environment compete via quantities, and we study how the information available to a firm affects its equilibrium profits. Indeed we find that if all firms have access to the same constant returns to scale technology, in any Bayesian equilibrium the information advan...
متن کاملCournot Oligopoly with Network Effects
The nature of competition is quite different in network industries as compared to the other, more traditional, ones. The purpose of the present paper is to thoroughly examine the implications of these differences as reflected in the dependence of equilibrium outputs, price and profits on industry concentration. We restrict the analysis to oligopolistic competition amongst firms in a market char...
متن کاملMultiproduct Cournot Oligopoly
We present a general model of oligopolistic quantity competition in which each firm is able to produce multiple quality-differentiated products. We identify a tight relationship between asymmetries in the technological capabilities of firms and the equilibrium structure of product lines. The qualities offered by a firm group naturally into brands, and the positions of such brands are determined...
متن کاملCommunication in Cournot oligopoly
We study communication in a static Cournot duopoly model under the assumption that firms have unverifiable private information about their costs. We show that cheap talk between the firms cannot transmit any information. However, if the firms can communicate through a third party, communication can be informative even when it is not substantiated by any commitment or costly actions. We exhibit ...
متن کاملInformation Sharing Networks in Oligopoly
We study the incentives of oligopolistic firms to share private information on demand parameters. Differently from previous studies, we consider bilateral sharing agreements, by which firms commit at the ex-ante stage to truthfully share information. We show that if signals are i.i.d., then pairwise stable networks of sharing agreements are either empty or made of fully connected components of ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The RAND Journal of Economics
سال: 1985
ISSN: 0741-6261
DOI: 10.2307/2555510