Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credible deviations from signaling equilibria
In games with costly signaling, some equilibria are vulnerable to deviations which could be “unambiguously” interpreted as coming from a unique set of Sender-types. This occurs when these types are precisely the ones who gain from deviating for any beliefs the Receiver could form over that set. We show that this idea characterizes a unique equilibrium outcome in two classes of games. First, in ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Game Theory
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0020-7276,1432-1270
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-009-0161-x