Creditor Control Rights and Board Independence
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Creditor rights and corporate risk-taking
We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy affect corporate investments by reducing corporate risk-taking. In cross-country analysis, we find that stronger creditor rights induce greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying acquisitions and of firms with low-recovery assets to acquire targets with high-recovery assets. These relations are strongest in countries where manage...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Journal of Finance
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0022-1082
DOI: 10.1111/jofi.12692