Cyber security based on mean field game model of the defender: Attacker strategies
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks
سال: 2017
ISSN: 1550-1477,1550-1477
DOI: 10.1177/1550147717737908