Data-Driven Integral Reinforcement Learning for Continuous-Time Non-Zero-Sum Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2019.2923845