David Lewis’s Humean Theory of Objective Chance

Chance and Necessity: from Humean Supervenience to Humean Projection

This paper attempts to develop a projectivistic understanding of chance or objective probability or partial determination. It does so by critically examining David Lewis’ philosophy of probability and his defense of Humean Supervenience, building thereupon the constructive projectivistic alternative, which will basically be a suitable reinterpretation of de Finetti’s position. Any treatment of ...

The Humean Theory of Reasons

This paper offers a simple and novel motivation for the Humean Theory of Reasons. According to the Humean Theory of Reasons, all reasons must be explained by some psychological state of the agent for whom they are reasons, such as a desire. This view is commonly thought1 to be motivated by a substantive theory about the power of reasons to motivate known as reason internalism, and a substantive...

Humean and an African Causal Theory: A Comparative Study

Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons

This paper addresses the two extensional objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons—that it allows for too many reasons, and that it allows for too few. Although I won’t argue so here, many of the other objections to the Humean Theory of Reasons turn on assuming that it cannot successfully deal with these two objections.1 What I will argue, is that the force of the too many and the too few obje...

Humean Dispositionalism

Humean metaphysics is characterised by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal po...