Debarment and collusion in procurement auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
This article presents the first experiment exploring impact of debarments – exclusion colluding bidders on collusion in procurement auctions. We find that reduce and bids relative to a market with no sanction. The deterrent effect increases length punishment. However, shorter efficiency increase non-debarred bidders. suggests are too lenient may trigger tacit among who remain market, thereby facilitating very behavior they aim deter.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['0899-8256', '1090-2473']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.05.011