Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Decentralized Bribery and Market Participation
I propose a bribery model with decentralized bureaucratic decisionmaking. There are multiple stable equilibria: high levels of bribery reduce the economy’s productivity due to suppression of small businesses, and reduces the total graft even though it might increase the individual bribe amount. The coordinated deviation to a better participation equilibrium is impossible due to decentralization...
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We investigate the structure of competitive quilibria in an exchange economy parametrized by (i) endowments and (ii) restrictions on market participation. For arbitrary regular endowments, if few consumers are restricted, there are no sunspot equilibria. If endowments are allowed to vary, while restrictions on market participation are fixed, there is a generic set of preferences uch that sunspo...
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We construct an equilibrium random matching model of the labour market, with endogenous market participation and a general matching technology that allows for market size effects: the job-finding rate for workers and the incentives for participation change with the level of unemployment. In comparison to standard models with constant returns to scale in matching, agent behaviour is more complex...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0347-0520
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12081