Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Decentralizing antipoverty program delivery in developing countries
We study the effects on accountability in government service delivery of decentralizing administration of an antipoverty program. While governments at both central and local levels are vulnerable to antipoor policy biases owing to political capture, centralized delivery systems are additionally prone to bureaucratic corruption, owing to problems in monitoring bureaucratic performance. Decentral...
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We thank Enrico Spolaore for early advice and Rajiv Vohra for helpful discussions on the topic. We are also grateful to James C. Davis for his help throughout the project, Christine Kearney for preparation of the federalism index, and Fumiko Tamura for her help as a research assistant. Finally we thank two anonymous referees and an editor for helpful detailed comments.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.01.001